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Abstract  
The present paper evaluates the quantitative impact of a pharmaceutical reform 
on pharmaceutical prices. A generic substitution policy was introduced in 
Finland in 2003 to contain rising pharmaceutical expenditure. After the reform 
pharmacists were obliged to propose a cheaper alternative to a prescribed 
pharmaceutical product whenever a substitutable product was available. There 
were three possible channels through which the price effect might have been 
transmitted. First, the policy might have affected manufacturers’ pricing 
behaviour for existing pharmaceutical products. Second, firms might have 
introduced new product variants of existing drugs to the market in the form of 
new generics or different package sizes. Third, the policy might have affected 
prices through the market structure, with more firms offering new product 
variants entering the market. Our evaluation is based on non-experimental data 
for the years 1997–2007 and difference-in-differences estimation techniques that 
allow for variations in programme effects over time and pre-treatment trends 
between pharmaceuticals. According to the results, the generic substitution 
policy has had a greater effect on prices by inducing manufacturers to change 
their pricing strategy for existing products in the market rather than by increasing 
the number of product variants or firms in the market. The re-form reduced prices 
at an increasing rate over time. In 2007 the prices of GS products were 40-45% 
lower relative to the time before the reform and relative to the respective change 
in the control group. Within the therapeutic drugs group the prices of close 
substitutes to generics, at ATC-7 digit level tended to decrease moderately. 
Controversially, more distant therapeutics, at ATC-4 digit level, prices rose, 
which may indicate a so-called generic paradox between more distant therapeutic 
and generic drugs It is reasonable to assume that at the ATC-4 level, where prices 
tend to increase, there are far less price-sensitive consumers (or physicians) than 
at the ATC-7 level, where the risk of substitution is more obvious and the 
proportion of price-sensitive consumers is likely to be greater. 
Key words: pharmaceuticals, generic substitution, difference-in-differences, pre-
treatment trends, therapeutic competition. 
JEL classification numbers: L65, L11, C23  
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1. Introduction 
Pharmaceuticals have continually captured an increasing share of total health 
care costs internationally. To curb increasing costs, many countries have 
reformed their systems for reimbursing medical expenses to patients. These 
reforms have included various versions of reference pricing and generic 
substitution.  
In Finland, pharmaceuticals accounted for less than 10% of total health care costs 
in 1990, whereas by the early 2000s the proportion had increased to 16% 
(Matveinen and Knape 2006, 2011). Since then, the trend has levelled off, mainly 
due to the generic substitution (GS) policy Finland introduced in April 2003. The 
reform and publicity around it increased a) consumer awareness of generic 
alternatives, allowing them to substitute a generic alternative to the prescribed 
pharmaceutical, and b) competition among manufacturers by making the entry of 
generic competitors more lucrative. Several reactions followed: incumbent 
manufacturers changed the pricing of existing drugs; they also introduced both 
new generics and new package (product) variants of existing drugs to the market, 
and totally new firms entered the Finnish pharmaceutical market with new 
generics and package variants. As a consequence, competition increased, generic 
pharmaceuticals captured increasing market shares and prices fell.  
The present paper evaluates, first, the overall quantitative impact of the generic 
substitution policy on pharmaceutical prices. Second, the paper investigates the 
relative scales of the reactions: 1) manufacturers’ pricing behaviour for existing 
pharmaceutical products, 2) the introduction of new product variants of existing 
drugs, and 3) the market structure and the degree to which new firms with new 
prices entered the market. The policy effect is estimated using panel data and 
difference-in-differences modelling techniques. According to our results, generic 
substitution caused significant reductions in the prices of pharmaceuticals. The 
policy also intensified competition, but the effects on market structure tended to 
vanish by the end of the evaluation period.          
Despite large and increasing pharmaceutical costs there are only a limited 
number of quantitative evaluations on the effects of different reimbursement 
schemes on pricing behaviour. The number of studies becomes even smaller 
when one concentrates on studies with a clearly defined time of intervention, 
entailing a formal statistical analysis in which the treatment group is observed 
before and after the intervention and compared with a control group (Brekke et 
al., 2009; Grootendorst et al. 2005 and 2006; Puig-Junoy 2007; Schneeweiss et 
al., 2002 and 2003; Marshall et al., 2002; Pavcnik, 2002). Galizzi at al. (2011) 
provide a comprehensive literature review of the results but also of the methods 
used to assess the effects of reference pricing policies. There is only one previous 
paper investigating the effects of the Finnish reform in 2003. Aalto-Setälä (2008) 
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finds that the average price of substitutable drugs decreased by more than 10% in 
a relatively short period of time between March 2003 and April 2004.  
The closest studies to our own are those of Pavcnik (2002) and Brekke et al. 
(2009). Studying prices of drugs in several therapeutic categories before and after 
the introduction of reference pricing, Pavcnik (2002) finds that the reference 
pricing policy in Germany reduced prices between 10% and 26%. There is a 
potential problem with the comparison group in this study, however, as it 
consists of therapeutic substitutes for drugs exposed to reference pricing. There 
may be cross-price effects that can potentially bias the results. 
Brekke et al. (2009) study the relationship between regulatory regimes and 
pharmaceutical firms’ pricing strategies in Norway. A reference pricing system 
introduced in 2003 for a sub-sample of off-patent pharmaceuticals replaced the 
price-cap regulation in the reform. The results show that the reform significantly 
reduced prices of pharmaceuticals in the reference pricing group relative to those 
in the price-cap group (8% for generics and 19% for brand-name drugs). A 
novelty in their research is that they are able to quantify the possible cross-price 
effect on therapeutic substitutes not included in the reference price system. This 
effect appears to be -2% in their study. The latter finding is an important 
contribution to the limited literature on therapeutic competition. The finding of 
Brekke et al. (2009) is in line with the seminal paper by Ellison et al. (1997), who 
use US data from one therapeutic field (cephalosporin), providing evidence of 
high-price elasticities between generic substitutes and also significant, though 
lower, elasticities between therapeutic substitutes.  
A main contribution of the present study is to allow for therapeutic competition 
to occur not only at the 4-digit level but also at the 7-digit level of the ATC 
classification. The study utilises two distinct groups of therapeutic competitors 
(henceforth TC groups). The TC1-group includes those pharmaceuticals with GS 
competitors at the same seven-digit level. These products have the same active 
substance as the pharmaceuticals in the GS group (treatment group) but have a 
different strength, form or package size, meaning that they have no GS 
substitutes. The TC2-group includes products with GS competitors at the more 
aggregated four-digit level, as in Brekke et al. (2009). The third control group is 
the actual control group (CG) which includes pharmacological substances that 
are non-substitutable and with no substitutable drugs in the same four-digit (or 
seven-digit) ATC group during the whole study period. These drugs are not 
related to GS products even in a therapeutic sense. 
The paper estimates difference-in-differences panel data models, where the prices 
of pharmaceuticals in the reform group and various control groups are monitored 
before and after the reform. Following Wolfers (2006), drug-level variations, as 
well as programme effects, are allowed to evolve over time. The main finding is 
that a generic substitution policy has a greater effect on prices by inducing 
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manufacturers to change their pricing strategy for existing products in the market 
rather than by increasing competition or the number of firms in the market. The 
reform reduced prices at an increasing rate over time. In 2007 the prices of GS 
products were 40-45% lower relative to the time before the reform and relative to 
the respective change in the control group. The results also show that within the 
TC group the prices of close substitutes to generics, at the ATC-7 digit level, 
tended to decrease moderately. Controversially, more distant therapeutics, at the 
ATC-4 digit level, prices rose, which may indicate a so-called generic paradox 
between more distant therapeutic and generic drugs. It is reasonable to assume 
that at the ATC-4 level, where prices tended to increase, there are far fewer price-
sensitive consumers (or physicians) than at the ATC-7 level, where the risk of 
substitution is more obvious and the proportion of price sensitive consumers is 
likely to be greater. 
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes features of the 
generic substitution reform and the pricing of pharmaceuticals in Finland. 
Section 3 provides theoretical predictions of how generic substitution might have 
influenced prices and the market structure (Section 3.1) but also of how 
therapeutic competitors might have reacted to price reductions for 
pharmaceuticals in the GS programme (Section 3.2). Sections 4 and 5 describe 
the data and models used in the empirical analysis. In sections 6 and 7 we present 
and discuss our empirical findings. 
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2. The generic substitution reform and the pricing of 
pharmaceuticals in Finland 
A programme of generic substitution (GS) was introduced in Finland in April 
2003, with a reference pricing scheme being added in March 2009. Both before 
and after the 2003 reform manufacturers were free to set the wholesale prices 
with one notable exception. Drugs reimbursable from the National Social 
Insurance Scheme were subject to price-cap regulation. The price cap, also 
referred to in Finnish legislation as a reasonable wholesale price, was and still is 
determined in negotiations between the pharmaceutical manufacturers and the 
Finnish Pharmaceutical Pricing Board (FPPB). In the application process the firm 
proposes a price cap, which is then either accepted or rejected by the FPPB. An 
accepted price cap defines the maximum price of the pharmaceutical. Although 
the maximum wholesale prices are regulated, the price-cap regulation allows for 
a reduction in prices. Also, there is no price cap for pharmaceuticals outside the 
reimbursement scheme. Price regulation is prevalent in the Finnish 
pharmaceutical market because 77% of pharmaceuticals consumed in outpatient 
care are subject to reimbursement from the National Social Insurance Scheme 
(Timonen et al., 2005).  
Since the government sets the fixed retail mark-ups for reimbursed drugs, price 
competition prevails only at the manufacturer level. Manufacturers have to sell 
the drugs at the same wholesale prices to all pharmacies and pharmacies are only 
allowed to add a fixed mark-up to the wholesale prices (Timonen et al., 2005). 
Therefore, the empirical analysis in the present paper will focus on wholesale 
prices. 
There were generic alternatives in the market even before the reform. The 
generic substitution scheme obliged pharmacists to propose a substitution for a 
drug to patients whenever physicians prescribe a drug that is not the cheapest 
substitutable medicinal product, i.e. in the price corridor. A substitution drug is 
offered from at prices lower than the upper limit of the price corridor. A 
pharmacy is also allowed to sell a drug close to the cheapest if it has run out of 
the cheapest drug.1 The Finnish Medicines Agency (FIMEA, earlier the National 
Agency for Medicines) maintains the list of substitutable medicinal products that 
are biologically equivalent and contain the same active substance in equal 
amounts and pharmaceutical form (Hartikainen-Herranen and Paldan, 2005). Not 
all products with the same active substance come under the generic substitution 
scheme. To gain substitution status the product must have the active substance in 
a certain amount and form. 
                                              
1 The price of a prescribed medicine is considered to be close to the cheapest when the price difference to 
the cheapest generic alternative is less than €2 (for products costing less than €40) or when the price 
difference to the cheapest is less than €3 (for those costing at least €40). 
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Both the prescribing physician and the purchasing individual could decline the 
substitution. If the physician wanted to prevent the replacement, it had to be done 
in advance, as pharmacists did not tell the physician if they made a replacement. 
The customer could decline substitution at the counter. If the patient declined the 
substitution, the potential saving arising from the consumption of a cheaper 
pharmaceutical was lost. In this respect denial of substitution was not totally 
costless for the patient. 
Drug advertising is tightly regulated in Finland. Furthermore, direct-to-consumer 
advertising (DTCA) does not exist due to legal issues relating to drugs dispensed 
by prescription only (Finnish Drugs Act 1987/395). However, drug firms are 
allowed to advertise their products directly to healthcare professionals via 
detailing for example. 
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3. Theoretical predictions on the impact of generic 
substitution  
3.1 Information and the market response after the GS reform 
Generic substitution as implemented in Finland provided incentives for patients 
to substitute expensive pharmaceutical treatments for inexpensive bioequivalent 
treatments. Theoretically speaking, this can happen through increased 
information about the low-priced alternatives. Before generic substitution a 
patient might not have been aware of low-priced generic pharmaceuticals. After 
the generic substitution reform, the pharmacist informs the patient about cheaper 
generic alternatives and suggests substituting an expensive prescribed 
pharmaceutical for an inexpensive generic product. Because the patient could 
still decline the substitution, generic substitution essentially increases price and 
product information in the market. Economic theory predicts that increased price 
information increases demand elasticities and intensifies price competition 
(Grossman and Shapiro, 1984). Secondly, implementation of generic substitution 
in Finland may have led to price reductions, because the price corridor provided 
firms an incentive to be among the cheapest. We therefore expect generic 
substitution to intensify price competition and reduce prices.     
Generic substitution may also intensify price competition through its effect on 
the market structure. If generic substitution induces new firms to enter the 
market, price competition may be fiercer after the reform simply because the 
market structure is more competitive. The profitability of generic entry may have 
been enhanced since the implementation of generic substitution, because the 
price corridor directly supports demand for inexpensive pharmaceuticals, which 
are typically generic products. Increased profitability may be a short-run 
phenomenon only, because in the long run the entry of generic products will 
reduce prices and the profitability of both potential entrants and incumbents in 
the market. For this reason we expect that in the short run the generic substitution 
will increase the number of competitors, but that this effect will level off in the 
long run after abnormal profits have been eliminated. And because of this 
predicted development in the market structure, price reductions due to a more 
competitive market structure are also expected to vanish in the long run. Despite 
this, generic substitution may still cause price reductions among incumbent 
products because patients are more informed. The following table summarises 
the expected effects of generic substitution on prices and market structure. 
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Table 1.  Expected effects of generic substitution on prices and the number 
of competitors 
 Short run Long run 
Prices, p Δp < 0 Δp ≤ 0 
Number of competitors, n  Δn > 0  Δn = 0 
 
3.2 Loyal consumers and optimal price response to generic 
competition 
The current literature analysing generic competition in pharmaceutical markets 
suggests that generic entry may lead to two kinds of market outcomes. The first 
prediction is in line with standard economic theory and suggests that the entry of 
generic pharmaceuticals intensifies price competition in the market and reduces 
prices of all substitute (both branded and generic) products. The central 
mechanism behind this result is that the entry of low-priced generic 
pharmaceuticals creates price competition among incumbent generic products but 
also causes the branded firm to reduce its price in competition for market shares. 
The empirical findings of Aronsson et al. (2001), Brekke et al. (2009) and 
Wiggins and Maness (2004) are consistent with this first prediction.  
The other market outcome is called the generic paradox due to the unorthodox 
response of the prices of branded pharmaceuticals to intensified generic 
competition. The generic paradox occurs when the entry of generic 
pharmaceuticals increases the price of a branded pharmaceutical. Frank and 
Salkever (1992) were the first to study the generic paradox with theoretical 
methods. They examined Stackelberg price competition between a branded 
pharmaceutical (a leader) and generic products (followers). The authors 
examined a market where the demand for the branded pharmaceutical consists of 
price-sensitive and loyal consumers. The consumption decisions of price-
sensitive consumers depend on the prices of the branded and generic 
pharmaceuticals, but loyal consumers consume only the branded pharmaceutical. 
One of the main results of Frank and Salkever (1992) is that the entry of generic 
pharmaceuticals may decrease the price elasticity of the reduced-form demand of 
the branded pharmaceutical, leaving room for the branded firm to raise its price. 
Frank and Salkever (1997), Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and Regan (2008) 
provide empirical evidence supporting this prediction. 
The model of Frank and Salkever (1992) examines price competition between 
branded and generic pharmaceuticals with the same chemical substance, possibly 
with advertising competition, but their results may not apply to a market 
environment with quality differences between competing pharmaceuticals. The 
quality differences may be spurious, which several authors (see e.g. Jelovac and 
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Bordoy, 2007, Kong, 2009) have cited as an explanation for the observed price 
differences between branded and generic pharmaceuticals. The quality 
differences may also be real, which occurs when a pharmaceutical product 
competes with pharmaceuticals containing a different chemical substance. The 
latter market environment has been called therapeutic competition (see e.g. 
Brekke et al., 2007). The model that we develop below can be interpreted from 
either of the above perspectives. Our model builds on Frank and Salkever (1992) 
and quality models by Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Motta (1993). The model’s 
predictions are used to interpret the price reactions of therapeutic competitors to 
the price competition from generic products that we observe in our data.     
Let us consider a market with two firms, firms 1 and 2, producing 
pharmaceuticals 1 and 2. The two pharmaceuticals are differentiated in terms of 
quality. In practice, quality may be an indicator of the health benefits of a 
pharmaceutical. Let us denote the quality of the firm i’s product as qi, where i = 
1, 2. We assume that firm 2 sells a high-quality product, and 0 < q1 ≤ q2. When 
the quality difference between the two pharmaceuticals is sufficiently high, it 
may be that consumers (physicians and patients) do not consider the 
pharmaceuticals as substitute products. To rule out this possibility, we require 
throughout the following analysis that q2 < 2q1 or alternatively that Δ/q1 < 1, 
where Δ ≡ q2 - q1. This condition implies that the quality of pharmaceutical 2 
cannot be more than 100% better than that of pharmaceutical 1. The prices of the 
drugs are denoted as p1 and p2. Both pharmaceuticals are produced at a constant 
marginal cost c, which is assumed to be zero (see e.g. Jelovac and Bordoy, 2006, 
Brekke et al., 2007).   
The market consists of two different types of consumers: loyal and price-
sensitive consumers (Frank and Salkever, 1992). The fraction α of the consumer 
population is loyal and the rest are price-sensitive. Willingness to pay for quality 
is denoted as θ and is assumed to be uniform U[0,1]-distributed in the consumer 
population. Each consumer consumes at most one unit of either pharmaceutical 
or no pharmaceuticals at all. The consumer with willingness to pay θ obtains 
utility 
 ( ) i iU i q pθ= −     (1.1) 
if she consumes pharmaceutical i = 1,2, and zero utility of she goes for an outside 
option with no pharmaceutical consumption. The demands in the price-sensitive 
segment of the market are defined as follows (see Motta, 1993): 
 
2
1 2 1
1
1 qd p p
q
 
= − Δ       (1.2) 
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and 
 
2 1
2 1 .
s p pd − = −  Δ      (1.3) 
Loyal consumers are loyal to pharmaceutical 2 despite any price differences 
between the two drugs. This implies that firm 2 is a monopoly producer in a 
market segment consisting of loyal consumers. Hence the demand for 
pharmaceutical 2 in that market segment is defined as follows:  
 
( )2 2 2
2
1 .ld q p
q
= −
 (1.4) 
Our interest is focused on the best response of firm 2 and, therefore, we next 
concentrate on the demand and profit of pharmaceutical 2. The demand for 
pharmaceutical 2 is defined as follows:  
( ) ( )
2 2
2 1
2 1
2 2
2 2 1 1 2 1
2 1
2
1 2 2
2
1 , 0
1( ) 1 1 1 ,
1 , ,
p qif p p
q q
p qD p p p if p p p
q q
p if p p q
q
α α
α
 
− ≤ ≤      
= − + − − − < < + Δ    Δ    
− + Δ ≤ ≤    (1.5) 
where p = (p1,p2) are the prices of the two pharmaceuticals. The profit function of 
firm 2 is defined as π2 = p2D2(p).  
The above demand function deserves some comments. When the price of 
pharmaceutical 2 is sufficiently high, price-sensitive consumers prefer to buy the 
low-quality pharmaceutical, in which case only loyal consumers purchase 
pharmaceutical 2. That segment of the market is called the loyal segment. When 
firm 2 reduces its prices below the threshold value p1 + Δ, some price-sensitive 
consumers are willing to purchase pharmaceutical 2. That segment of the market 
is referred to as the price-sensitive segment. When the price of pharmaceutical 2 
is low, below the threshold value (q2/q1)p1, both price-sensitive and loyal 
consumers purchase the monopoly quantity (1.4), which constitutes the demand 
function of pharmaceutical 2. We call the last segment the monopoly segment. 
The main theoretical result is presented in the following proposition. Our interest 
is focused on examining the behaviour of the best-response function of firm 2, 
p2(p1), which contains the basic information about how firm 2 reacts to price 
changes by firm 1. We show that the best-response function increases 
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monotonically (the two pharmaceuticals are strategic complements) where there 
are only few loyal consumers in the market (see Figure 1, Case 2). In that case 
the best response of firm 2 to a price reduction in the rival product is to choose a 
less expensive price (see also Brekke et al., 2009). On the other hand, if the 
market consists mainly of loyal consumers, a reduction in the price of product 1 
may also cause product 2 to increase its price2 (see Figure 1, Case 1).  
Proposition If α ≥ Δ/q1, then the best-response function of firm 2 is  
 
( )
( )
2
2
1 1
2 1 2
1 1 1
2
2 1
2 1
1 1 1
1
2 1
1
ˆ, 0
2
1
ˆ,
2 1
( )
,
2
, .
2 2
q if p p
q p
if p p p
q
p p
q qp if p p
q
q qif p
α
α α
 ≤ ≤
− + Δ    < ≤ Δ + −   
=  
< ≤  
>
 
 
Otherwise, if α < Δ/q1, the best-response of firm 2 is 
 
( )
( )
2 1 2
1 1
2
22 1
2 1 1 1 1
1
2 1
1
1
, 0
2 1
( ) ,
2
, ,
2 2
q p
if p p
q
q qp p p if p p
q
q qif p
α
α α

− + Δ   ≤ ≤
Δ + −    
= < ≤  
>
 
 
where  
 21
( (1 ) )
ˆ
1
q
p
α α α
α
−Δ + Δ Δ + −
≡
−
 
and 
 2 11
2
.
(1 )
qp
qα α
Δ
≡
Δ + Δ + −
 
 
 
Proof. See Appendix 1 
                                              
2 This occurs in particular when price p1 becomes sufficiently low. 
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Figure 1.  Price response of firm 2 
 
 
 12 
 
4. Data 
4.1 Classifications 
We obtained data from the Finnish Medicines Agency. Our data contain drugs 
from eight 3-digit ATC groups: A02, C07, C08, C09, C10, N03, N05, and N06. 
Altogether there are 158 different active substances (henceforth also drugs) at the 
7-digit ATC level (see Appendix 2).  
The unit of observation is even more disaggregated, however, when referring to a 
product. For the same drug there can be several products defined by the 
manufacturer, the number of daily dosages per package (DDD), the size of the 
package (in millilitres or grams), and the strength of one tablet or unit in a 
package (in millilitres or grams). Some of the products refer to the original brand 
name drug and others to the generic substitutes or parallel imported products. 
The data at hand do not distinguish between brand name and generic products. 
The data are spread over 44 three-month periods, starting from the first quarter of 
1997 and ending at the fourth quarter of 2007. The data set is an unbalanced 
panel data set due to the entry and exit of pharmaceutical products. In the whole 
data set there are some 48,000 observations referring to a product over a three-
month period.3  
The paper examines prices mainly in three distinct groups of pharmaceuticals. 
The first group includes  products that were i) either subject to generic 
substitution from the 2nd quarter of 2003 onwards or ii) entered the programme 
later during the period of investigation. This group of products is called the 
generic substitution group (the GS group).  
The second group includes products that are non-substitutable over the whole 
observation period, but belong to a 4-digit level ATC group containing some 
substitutable products (altogether there are 15 4-digit ATC groups in the data). 
These products are called therapeutic competitors (the TC group), because the 
active substances in these groups are developed to treat the same medical 
condition as those in the GS group, but for some reason these pharmaceuticals 
are not part of the substitution programme. 
In order to go deeper in checking the validity of the control group and to learn 
more about reactions in the therapeutic competitors group, we also use another 
categorisation where the therapeutic competitors group is split into two. The first 
(TC1) includes those products with GS competitor(s) at the same disaggregated 
                                              
3 The raw data include more than 53,000 observations. We use a cleaned data set where odd changes in 
prices, less than one year appearances, and missing observations in the middle of a series were removed 
from the data. 
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seven-digit level, i.e. the same drug. These TC1 products contain the same active 
substance as the products in the GS group but have a strength, form or package 
size that makes them non-substitutable in the generic substitution programme. 
The second group (TC2) includes products that have GS competitor(s) only at a 
more aggregated four-digit level. The separation of the TC group into the TC1 
and TC2 groups reveals the level at which therapeutic substitution is most 
prevalent. Brekke et al. (2009) argue that therapeutic substitution may occur at 
the 4-digit level, whereas we allow this to happen both at the 4- and 7-digit 
levels. 
Since the inclusion of therapeutic substitutes in the control group may bias the 
results, we also use another control group, which includes products that are non-
substitutable in the GS programme and face no competition from any 
substitutable drug in the same 4-digit ATC group. This category is called the 
control group (the CG group), since these drugs are not substitutable nor are they 
related to any product in the GS group in a therapeutic sense.  
The period of investigation spans from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth 
quarter of 2007. The total number of different drugs (different ATC codes at the 
7-digit level) remains stable, particularly after the third quarter. Then, the total 
number is between 118 and 134. However, the number of GS drugs increases 
more or less over the whole period (Figure 2). A large majority of drugs that 
become substitutable do so at the beginning of the programme in quarter 26 (“GS 
after participation”), which refers to the second quarter of 2003. Less than 20 
drugs become substitutable after quarter 26 (“GS before participation”). Very 
few drugs participate in the programme only for the last two periods. The last 
drugs entering the programme do so after quarter 42 (the curve reaches zero in 
the last 2 quarters, where quarter 44 refers to the fourth quarter of 2007). The 
number of different drugs in the therapeutic competitor groups (including both 
TC1 and TC2) first increases and then after the policy reform starts declining. 
The number of drugs sold in the market in the control group, CG, remains stable 
until period 19, after which it also starts declining.  
 14 
 
Figure 2.  Number of different drugs in the three groups 
 
4.2 Changes in prices 
The variable of interest, the price of a product, is measured relative to the daily 
dosage (price per DDD, €) and refers to the average wholesale price of the 
product over a three month period. A similar definition of the unit price has been 
used widely in the literature on pharmaceutical markets (see e.g. Brekke et al., 
2009; Pavcnik, 2002; Ellison et al., 1997). We present basic statistics on the 
prices of pharmaceutical products in the GS, CG and TC groups in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Summary statistics on the price variable in different groups 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GS 27019 0.666 0.940 0.019 12.730 
CG 2738 0.467 0.174 0.125 0.812 
TC 18454 1.324 3.613 0.026 71.805 
 
In order to have a better understanding of the price trend over time, we next 
present the trend of average prices in the GS, CG and TC groups. The last group 
consists of all pharmaceuticals in the 4-digit ATC group containing at least one 
product in the generic substitution programme, i.e. products in the TC group. The 
mean price of products in the GS group is very stable in the pre-treatment period, 
whereas the price trend turns downwards right after the reform and turns slightly 
back up towards the end of the investigation period (Figure 3). The TC group 
 15 
 
shows an increasing trend before the reform and the trend becomes even slightly 
steeper after the reform. This may happen if the cross-price elasticity of the 
products in the TC and GS groups is small, and a firm selling a TC product does 
not lose demand when raising the price of its product. This certainly takes place 
when the share of loyal consumers in the market is large, as suggested by the 
theoretical model in Section 3.2. Therefore we explain the increasing trend in the 
prices of TC products by the presence of a large number of loyal consumers 
(physicians and patients) in the market. In practice, loyalty may arise from the 
fact that pharmaceuticals in the TC and CG groups differ so much that consumers 
do not consider any two products as close substitutes.  
Figure 3.  The mean price per daily dosage in three groups of drugs 
 
Simple averages within groups may hide varying developments in volumes sold. 
Weighting the drugs according to volumes sold shows the trend of the effective 
prices in the market from the consumers’ point of view. When we look at the log 
of total euros per DDD sold, the decrease in prices of GS products appears to be 
stronger than above (Figure 4). A stronger decline suggests that cheaper drugs 
are gaining more market share. The trends in the TC and CG groups observed 
above also remain in the weighted figure. 
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Figure 4.  Log of weighted drug prices in the three groups 
 
Visually discernible differences in price trends between the groups before the 
reform must be taken into account in the estimation (Wolfers 2006).4 If the 
differences in trends were not controlled for, they would interfere with the 
estimate of the reform effect. For example, an increasing trend of the TC group 
relative to the GS group would make the estimated price decrease larger than 
what it actually was. Pre-treatment trends are statistically investigated in 
Appendix 3. 
4.3 New product variants and firms 
The prices of GS drugs decrease if manufacturers change their pricing policies 
for existing products or incumbent and entrant manufacturers introduce new 
cheaper generics and product variants (package versions) to the market. The 
number of different product versions in the GS group increases particularly right 
after the reform, then declines towards the end of the investigation period (Figure 
5). The changes coincide with the price trend of the GS drugs. In contrast, the 
number of different product versions of CG drugs declines radically over time. 
Product variants are less common in the TC group, a finding that applies 
particularly to TC1 products rather than TC2 products (feature not shown in 
Figure 5). 
  
                                              
4 Since there are more than 1200 different products in the data at hand and on average only 33 time series 
observations per product, we are not concerned about possible unit root processes (Woolridge 2002). 
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Figure 5.  Number of different product versions per drug. 
 
New generics or product variants can be introduced to the market by incumbents 
and entrants. The number of distinct firms5 selling the same GS drugs increases 
strongly right after the reform and decreases somewhat towards the end of the 
investigation period (Figure 5). The number of distinct firms selling the same TC 
or CG drugs remains fairly stable. The number of different firms decreases 
towards the end of the investigation period, which coincides with the change in 
the price trend of the GS drugs. 
Figure 6.  Number of distinct firms per drug by group 
 
                                              
5 Firms with subsidiary or affiliated companies are classified as one company. 
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The increasing number of firms in the market shows up well in the level of 
competition measured by the Herfindahl index, which sums the squared market 
shares of firms by drug (Figure 7). The measure is higher the more concentrated 
the market is. Therefore, stronger competition decreases the index. Towards the 
end of the period the severity of competition decreases in the treatment group. 
Competitive pressure decreases slightly in the two control groups over time. 
Figure 7.  Herfinhal index by quarter 
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5. Empirical models 
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. The first part estimates the overall 
effect of the reform on prices with and without trends and weights, and checks 
the robustness of various control groups, i.e. CG, TC1 and TC2. Then, the second 
part analyses the extent to which the estimated price effect is due to incumbent 
products getting less expensive relative to the alternative, where the expansion of 
the GS programme and the introduction of new products account for the results 
found. The third part scrutinises the extent to which new firms affect prices, and 
the final part examines to what extent the reform has affected the market 
structure and level of competition. 
The price model 
The basic estimated model for the price analysis is: 
6
, , , 1 2 3
1
ln( ) 1 2i t j i t j i i i
j
price Participation GS TC TCφ α β β β
=
= + + + +  
4 158 44 158
, , ,
1 2 2 2
*c i t c d d t t d d t i t
c d t d
control drug time drug trendγ δ τ χ ε
= = = =
+ + + + +     (1.6) 
 
where ln(price)i,t refers to the logarithmic price per daily dosage of product i in 
time period t. Six ‘participation’ variables (j=1,…,6) indicate the length of time 
observation i has participated in the programme. Each of the six dummies refers 
to time intervals of three (or four) quarters. For the majority of the GS drugs the 
participation dummy number 1 (j=1) is one in the 26th, 27th and 28th quarter (zero 
otherwise), the second participation dummy is one from the 29th to the 31st 
quarter, and so on. The last period dummy includes four quarters (41th – 44th 
quarter), and all products with 1 in the Participation 6 dummy variable have been 
in the programme from the beginning in April 2003 (time period 26). For those 
drugs that enter the programme later than in period 26, the participation dummies 
refer to later time periods accordingly, and for those products there are less than 
six participation dummies with value 1. As can be seen in Figure 1 above, the 
latest arrivals are only included in the Participation 1 dummy, since they 
participate in the programme in the two last periods (43 and 44).  
Rather than using one participation variable only, splitting it up into six distinct 
dummies makes it possible to detect any changes in the programme effect over 
time. It also remedies the risk of confounding pre-existing trends with the policy 
impact (Wolfers, 2006). Since the characteristics of different products are 
controlled for (with product DDD, product strength, package size, and age of the 
product) and the drug-level fixed effects (drugd variables) and time dummies 
(timet variables) are included, the coefficients α1-α6 capture the average 
programme effect over time for the GS drugs relative to the control group. The 
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baseline model is first estimated by OLS and then by weighted least squares, 
where sales of one product relative to the total sales in a period are used as 
weights. Finally, the ‘drug times trend’ interaction variables control for the pre-
treatment trends. The other variables are described above. 
The model for market structure  
For modelling the policy effects on the market structure, the data are aggregated 
up to the drug level. The structure of the model is rather similar to the previous 
one, apart from a different dependent variable. Now we model the effect of the 
reform on the log of the Herfindahl index. 
6 4
,, , ,
1 1
ln( ) d td t j j d t c
j c
Herfindahl Participation controlφ α γ
= =
= + +   
158 44
,
2 2
d d t t d t
d t
drug timeδ τ ε
= =
+ + +    (1.7) 
 
The participation dummy turns on when at least one product with the same active 
substance participates in the GS programme. The control variables are now the 
means of different products with the same active ingredient. Distinct GS or TC 
dummies are no longer needed, since the fixed effects included in the model are 
at the same level of aggregation as the group dummies.  
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6. Results 
6.1 Baseline and robustness checks 
A first specification of the price model (equation (1.6) above) excludes weights 
and the drug-level trends and suggests that prices of GS drugs drop by 20 per 
cent during the first three quarters when the GS drugs are in the programme 
(Figure 8). The effect increases over time, reaching -45 per cent by the fourth 
participation period (10th–12th quarter after start of the reform) and levelling off 
after that. Very narrow confidence intervals (CI- and CI+) indicate precisely 
estimated coefficients. When the drug-level trends are added and the equation is 
estimated by weighting the volumes sold, the effect is first smaller, but 
eventually reaches the same level as in the first specification. This indicates that 
drugs that get cheaper over time also gain more dominance in the market. The 
latter specification is called the baseline and all the specifications below it will be 
compared to this baseline model. 
Figure 8.  Total price effect over time 
 
We present the results of the model without weights and drug level trends, 
henceforth Model 1, and the baseline model in Table 3 below. In the baseline 
model the estimated parameters of the participation dummies from 2 to 6 indicate 
significant differences between the prices of GS group and CG group products, 
while in Model 1 the price effects tend to be slightly greater, causing all the 
parameter estimates of the participation dummies to be statistically significant. In 
order to estimate the price differences in percentage terms, as displayed in Figure 
8, we used transformations exp(αj) - 1 for j =1,2,...,6.  The high value of R2 
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shows that the variables included in the baseline model (also Model 1) explain 
the variation in the prices of pharmaceuticals well.       
Adding weights turns the effect curve clockwise, so that the effect is initially 
smaller and eventually larger in the weighted specifications (Figure 8 and Table 
3). This finding applies to the specifications both with and without trends (not 
reported in figure). Adding drug-level trends, in turn, decreases the estimated 
effect during each participation dummy, implying that part of the estimated effect 
without trends includes differences in price trends that are not related to the 
reform (not reported in figure).  
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Assuming that drug companies anticipated the policy change, they could have 
started re-pricing products before the actual policy reform. To model this option, 
we added two dummies to the baseline specification to indicate whether the 
product in question will enter the GS programme in 1-3 quarters or in 4-6 
quarters. It appears that GS prices tended to increase close to the policy reform. 
After controlling for this phenomenon, the estimated policy effect after the 
reform remains very similar relative to the baseline specification. In the baseline 
the effect is -41 per cent during the Participation 5 dummy (quarters 38-40) and -
45 per cent during the Participation 6 dummy (quarters 41-44). In the 
specification allowing for anticipation of the reform, the respective estimates are 
-42 per cent and -42 per cent (not reported in figure but obtained from the 
authors). 
Returning to the baseline specification, the exclusion of CG drugs from the 
sample does not change the results (Figure 9). In contrast, the baseline result 
drops somewhat when groups TC1 and TC2 are jointly excluded (not reported in 
the figure), implying that firms selling products in the TC group increased prices 
in response to decreasing prices in the GS group (see Figure 9). Splitting the TC 
group into two parts shows that the exclusion of the more distant therapeutic 
competitors (TC2) decreases the estimated effect, whereas the exclusion of the 
more close TC1s increases it (Figure 9). This indicates that manufacturers 
increased the prices of TC2 products as a reaction to the reform, because a 
comparison of GS with TC1 and CG (excluding TC2) gives a smaller programme 
effect than that of GS to all three comparison groups. 
Figure 9.  The price effect of the GS group relative to the various control 
groups 
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This issue can also be analysed differently by introducing 12 new dummies to the 
model, i.e. six new dummies both for TC1 and TC2 products. These dummies 
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refer to the three (or four) quarter periods after the reform, similarly to the 
Participation 1 – Participation 6 dummies for the GS products that were in the 
programme from its beginning in period 26. Thus this specification has a total of 
18 dummies modelling the effect of the reform on GS, TC1 and TC2 products 
relative to the control group (CG). As with the specification above, the results 
here indicate that the prices of TC2 drugs became more expensive in reaction to 
the reform even though the specification includes drug-specific trends (Figure 
10). The effect on GS drugs is somewhat smaller, corresponding to a 5 per cent 
reduction at the end of the period (- 40% instead of - 45%). 
Figure 10.  Effects of reform on GS, TC1 and TC2 drugs relative to the 
control group 
 
6.2 Role of programme expansion, new product versions and new 
firms 
The baseline result remains when all those drugs (ATC 7-digit level) that entered 
the market after the policy reform are excluded from the sample (keeping the 
control groups as they are in the baseline) (Figure 11). This result is as expected, 
since only a few totally new pharmaceuticals were introduced to the market 
during the period of investigation. 
In contrast, the exclusion of new product versions from the sample strongly 
magnifies the negative effect. The effects are even more negative when the 
programme expansion is accounted for, i.e. when products entering the GS 
programme later than in period 26 are excluded from the sample. This 
specification excludes all those products (and totally new drugs) that entered the 
GS programme after the start of the programme. New product versions could be 
introduced to the market either by incumbent or entrant firms. The results suggest 
that the major effect comes from incumbents, since the baseline effect is virtually 
untouched when new firm entrants are excluded from the sample.  
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The findings of this subsection combined indicate the following. First, the 
strongest effect on pharmaceutical prices is caused by existing products getting 
cheaper (excluding new products makes the estimates larger). Second, price 
reductions for pharmaceuticals entering the GS programme later on were as 
strong as those for original participants (excluding programme expansion 
increases the effect). Third, the number of firms operating in the market seems to 
be is less important, which means that it is the actual behaviour of existing firms 
and the threat of new entrants that matter (excluding new entrant firms does not 
change the results). The last finding is further investigated below by estimating 
the effect of the reform on the number of firms selling each pharmaceutical and 
market concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index. 
Figure 11.  Effects of programme expansion, new drugs, new product 
variants and new firms 
 
6.3 Results on market structure 
A simple model regressing the Herfindahl index at the drug level on the drug 
level participation dummies and controls indicates that the reform intensified 
competition by some 10 per cent up to the 12th quarter (3 years) (Figure 12). The 
effect becomes lesser later on and in the last four periods (16th – 19th) it is not 
statistically significant any more. The estimation results of the model (1.7) are 
presented in Appendix 4. This is in accordance with the plain time series figures 
for prices above, showing that competition started easing off towards the end of 
the period. This model also suggests that in relative terms the effect of the reform 
on competition has been much milder than that on prices. 
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Figure 12.  Effect of reform on drug level competition measured by the 
Herfindahl index 
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7. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper we have evaluated the price effect of the generic substitution reform 
in Finland. The effects are substantive and the reform was a success. The reform 
reduced prices and the policy effect increased over time over the whole 
investigation period. In 2007 the prices of GS products were 40-45% lower than 
before the reform. The policy had a larger effect on prices by inducing 
manufacturers to change their pricing strategy for existing products in the market 
rather than by increasing competition and the number of firms in the market.  
A generic substitution policy appears to increase price information to consumers, 
which leads to increasing price competition, explaining the effect of the policy on 
prices. In order to understand therapeutic competition better, we also analysed 
markets with loyal and price-sensitive consumers (physicians) choosing between 
two quality-differentiated pharmaceuticals.  
Brekke et al. (2009) show that therapeutic drugs were strategic complements for 
generic drugs at the 4-digit ATC level in Norwegian data, but our results do not 
support this finding. The prices of therapeutic drugs tended to increase clearly 
after generic substitution was implemented and generic price competition 
intensified. At the 7-digit ATC level therapeutic products are substitutes for 
generic products, but the observed price reactions tended to be moderate. Based 
on our theoretical model, one explanation for the observed differences in pricing 
behaviour is the proportion of loyal and price sensitive consumers. It is 
reasonable to assume that at the ATC-4 level, where prices tended to increase, 
there are far fewer price-sensitive consumers (or physicians) than at the ATC-7 
level, where the risk of substitution is more obvious and the proportion of price-
sensitive consumers is likely to be greater. 
According to Brekke et al. (2009), so-called generic paradox results may be due 
to different market structures and regulatory regimes in the US compared to 
European countries. Danzon and Furukawa (2011) show that the prices of 
branded pharmaceuticals remain more or less stable after generic entry, but due 
to different regulatory practices price levels differ across countries. Kanavos et 
al. (2008) studied off-patent generic entry in the US, Canada and several 
European countries and found indications of generic paradox in terms of 
originator drugs holding their price stable after generic entry. Regan (2008) 
provides empirical evidence of generic paradox in US markets. In Hungary a 
therapeutic substitution programme (Kaló et al. 2007) did not cause expected 
price reductions but increased the prices of some statins.  
Some theoretical and empirical models suggest that generic paradox should not 
be interpreted between same the active ingredients only, but should be defined in 
a broader sense (Stern 1996; Regan 2008; Kong 2009). Intramolecular analysis 
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cannot explain the generic paradox at the therapeutic level. Should this 
phenomenon be referred to as a therapeutic rather than a generic paradox? 
Despite the increasing number of regulatory attempts, it still remains unclear how 
regulation affects pharmaceutical expenditure and pharmaceutical markets. There 
is evidence that in most cases generic substitution increases competition and cuts 
prices in the same active ingredient group and that a reference price system 
should create an incentive for consumers for switch to cheaper products. On the 
other hand, we observe that generic substitution may increase the prices of 
therapeutic competitors, which would be an undesired outcome for regulators. 
Being one of the possible outcomes in the market, however, such consequences 
should also be taken into account when designing regulatory policies like generic 
substitution and reference pricing. 
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 
The profit function of firm 2 is defined as follows: 
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Let us denote the three parts of the profit function πm(p) ≡ p2(1-p2/q2), πs(p) ≡ 
p2[α(1-p2/q2) + (1-α)(1-(p2-p1)/Δ)] and πl(p) ≡ p2(1-p2/q2), where m, s and l refer 
to the monopoly, price-sensitive and loyal segments of the market. Direct 
computation shows that the profit of firm 2 is a strictly concave function 
everywhere and, furthermore, that the profit is a continuous function in price p2. 
We derive local maximum points for each market segment separately. Let us first 
consider the monopoly segment of the market. The problem of firm 2 is to 
maximise profit πm(p) subject to the constraint 0 ≤ p2 ≤ (q2/q1)p1. Assume first 
that the solution of the firm's maximisation problem is an interior solution. Then 
it must satisfy the first-order condition 
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It is worth observing that p2 = 0 cannot solve the maximization problem, because 
firm 2 can always increase its profit by raising p2. By solving the above first-
order condition, we obtain p21 = q2/2 as an interior local maximum in the 
monopoly segment. Now it holds true that p2m < (q2/q1)p1 if and only if p1 > q1/2 
≡ p11. Therefore, the local maximum in the monopoly segment is p2m = q2/2, if p1 
≥ p11, and p2m = (q2/q1)p1, if p1 < p11. The corresponding profit is π2m = q2/4, if p1 ≥ p11, and π2m = q2(p1/q1)(1- (p1/q1)), if p1 < p11. 
In the price-sensitive segment we analyse the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The 
Lagrangian function in the price-sensitive segment is defined as follows: 
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The necessary first-order conditions of the problem are: 
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Assume first that λ = μ = 0 at the solution of the maximization problem. Then 
from the first-order condition i) we obtain the interior solution:  
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Substituting the solution (2.1) into the condition ii) yields us: 
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which defines the maximum value of p1 for which the interior solution (2.1) 
applies. Similarly, substituting (2.1) into the condition iii) gives us:  
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which defines the minimum value of p1 for which the interior solution applies. 
The maximum profit in the interior solution (2.1) is: 
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Let us then consider the case where λ > 0 and μ = 0. From the condition ii) we 
then obtain the corner solution p2 = (q2/q1)p1. Substituting this solution into the 
first-order condition i) we obtain   
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Now the condition λ > 0 implies that p1 > p12, which defines the set of prices for 
which the corner solution applies.    
Consider next the case λ = 0 and μ > 0. From the condition iii) we then obtain the 
second corner solution p2 = p1 + Δ. Substituting the corner solution into condition 
i) we obtain 
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The condition μ > 0 implies that p1 < p13, which defines the set of price values for 
which the corner solution applies. 
The case in which λ > 0 and μ > 0 yields us a solution in which both constraints 
are binding. In such a case prices must satisfy the conditions p1 = q1 and p2 = q2. 
Substituting these solutions into the condition i) we obtain λ = μ+(1/Δ)[αΔ + (1-
α)q2], which the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers λ and μ must satisfy in the corner 
solution. 
As the third case, we consider the loyal market segment. Firm 2 maximises profit 
π2l(p) subject to the constraint p1+Δ ≤ p2 ≤ q2. Assuming an interior solution for 
maximisation, the solution must satisfy first-order condition: 
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Again, p2 = q2 does not solve the maximisation problem for firm 2, because the 
profit of firm 2 is strictly decreasing at p2 = q2. From the above condition we 
obtain p2l = q2/2 as the interior solution in the loyal market segment. The interior 
solution satisfies the condition p2l  ≥ p1+ Δ, when p1 ≤ q2/2 – Δ ≡ p14. The local 
maximum in the loyal segment is then p2l = q2/2 if 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p14 and p2l = p1 + Δ 
otherwise. The corresponding maximum profit is π2l = α(q2/4), if 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p14, and π2l = α(p1+Δ)(1-(p1+Δ)/q2), if p1 > p14.  
In order to find the global maximum of the problem, we still need to compare the 
maximum profits at the local maximum points. Direct computation establishes 
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the ranking p13 < p14 < p12 ≤ p11 between the threshold values. This implies that 
the global maximum point is uniquely defined by one of the local maximum 
points for all values of p1 except those in the interval [p14,p13], where one needs 
to compare the maximum profits at the interior solutions of the loyal and price-
sensitive market segments. Now π2s ≥ π2l, if the price p1 satisfies the condition: 
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and π2s < π2l otherwise. It can be shown also that 1ˆ 0p  , if and only if α ≥ (q2  - 
q1)/q1.   
Therefore, the best-response function of firm 2 p2(p1) is defined as follows. 
Suppose that the condition α ≥ (q2  - q1)/q1  holds true. Then the best response is 
p2(p1) = q2/2, if 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1pˆ ; p2(p1) = p2s, if 1pˆ < p1 ≤ p12; p2(p1) = (q2/q1)p1, if p12 
< p1 ≤ p11; and finally p2(p1) = q2/2 for p1 > p11. In case α < (q2  - q1)/q1 it holds 
true that 1ˆ 0p   and the best-response function is p2(p1) = p2s, if 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p12; p2(p1) 
= (q2/q1)p1, if p12 < p1 ≤ p11; and p2(p1) = q2/2 for p1 > p11. Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 2: Different drugs (active substances) 
1 Acebutolol 56 Gemfibrozil 111 Perphenazine 
2 Acipimox 57 Haloperidol 112 Phenobarbital 
3 Alprenolol 58 Imidapril 113 Phenytoin 
4 Amitriptyline 59 Irbesartan 114 Phenytoin, 
combinations 
5 Amlodipine 60 Isradipine 115 Pindolol 
6 Aripiprazole 61 Labetalol 116 Pravastatin 
7 Atenolol 62 Lamotrigine 117 Pregabalin 
8 Atenolol and other 
diuretics 
63 Lansoprazole 118 Primidone 
9 Atorvastatin 64 Lansoprazole, amoxicillin and 
clarithromycin 
119 Prochlorperazine 
10 Betaxolol 65 Lansoprazole, metronidazole and 
amoxicillin 
120 Promazine 
11 Bezafibrate 66 Lansoprazole, metronidazole and 
tetracycline 
121 Propranolol 
12 Bismuth subcitrate 67 Lercanidipine 122 Quetiapine 
13 Bisoprolol 68 Levetiracetam 123 Quinapril 
14 Bisoprolol and thiazides 69 Levomepromazine 124 Quinapril and diuretics 
15 Candesartan 70 Lisinopril 125 Rabeprazole 
16 Candesartan and 
diuretics 
71 Lisinopril and diuretics 126 Ramipril 
17 Captopril 72 Lithium 127 Ramipril and diuretics 
18 Carbamazepine 73 Losartan 128 Ramipril and felodipine 
19 Carvedilol 74 Losartan and diuretics 129 Ranitidine 
20 Celiprolol 75 Lovastatin 130 Ranitidine bismuth 
citrate 
21 Cerivastatin 76 Maprotiline 131 Reboxetin 
22 Chlorpromazine 77 Melperone 132 Risperidone 
23 Chlorprothixene 78 Memantine 133 Rivastigmine 
24 Cilazapril 79 Metoprolol 134 Rosuvastatin 
25 Cimetidine 80 Metoprolol and other diuretics 135 Sertraline 
26 Citalopram 81 Metoprolol and thiazides 136 Simvastatin 
27 Clofibrate 82 Metoprolol, combination packages 137 Sotalol 
28 Clomipramine 83 Mianserin 138 Sulpiride 
29 Clonazepam 84 Milnacipran 139 Tacrine 
30 Clozapine 85 Mirtazapine 140 Telmisartan 
31 Colestipol 86 Misoprostol 141 Telmisartan and 
diuretics 
32 Colestyramine 87 Moclobemide 142 Thioproperazine 
33 Diltiazem 88 Moexipril 143 Thioridazine 
34 Dixyrazine 89 Molindone 144 Timolol 
35 Donepezil 90 Nebivolol 145 Topiramate 
36 Doxepin 91 Nefazodone 146 Trandolapril 
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37 Duloxetine 92 Nicotinic acid 147 Trandolapril and 
verapamil 
38 Enalapril 93 Nifedipine 148 Trazodone 
39 Enalapril and diuretics 94 Nilvadipine 149 Trimipramine 
40 Eprosartan 95 Nimodipine 150 Valproic acid 
41 Eprosartan and diuretics 96 Nisoldipine 151 Valsartan 
42 Escitalopram 97 Nizatidine 152 Valsartan and diuretics 
43 Esomeprazole 98 Nortriptyline 153 Venlafaxine 
44 Ethosuximide 99 Olanzapine 154 Verapamil 
45 Ezetimibe 100 Olmesartan medoxomil 155 Vigabatrin 
46 Famotidine 101 Olmesartan medoxomil and diuretics 156 Ziprasidone 
47 Felodipine 102 Omeprazole 157 Zonisamide 
48 Fenofibrate 103 Omeprazole, amoxicillin and 
metronidazole 
158 Zuclopenthixol 
49 Fluoxetine 104 Oxcarbazepine   
50 Flupentixol 105 Oxprenolol   
51 Fluphenazine 106 Pantoprazole   
52 Fluvastatin 107 Paroxetine   
53 Fluvoxamine 108 Periciazine   
54 Gabapentin 109 Perindopril   
55 Galantamine 110 Perindopril and diuretics   
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Appendix 3: Pre-treatment trends 
To investigate differences in price trends statistically, we regress the log of price 
per DDD during the pre-treatment period on 157 drug dummies, 24 quarter 
dummies, 3 group dummies (GS for the generic substitution group and TC1 and 
TC2 for the therapeutic competitors groups), 3 control variables1, and three sets 
of interaction terms. We have both the drug and group dummies, since not all 
product versions sharing the same active ingredient come under the GS 
programme. Sets of interaction terms model differences in trends. One set 
includes time dummies times the GS dummy (GS*time dummies) and the other 
two sets include the time dummies times a dummy for the TC1 group or time 
dummies times dummy for the TC2 group. We estimate the model:  
158 25 3
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25 25 25
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2 2 2
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1 2
i t d d t t c i t c
d t c
t i t t i t t i t i t
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   
      
  
  
 
 
The coefficients of the interaction terms are shown in Figure A1. It appears that 
the prices of GS drugs slightly decrease relative to the prices in the control group. 
The increasing price trend of the therapeutic competitors shown above accrues 
from increasing prices for TC2 drugs, i.e. drugs that do not have GS drugs at the 
same ATC 7-digit level, only at the 4-digit level. In contrast, the price trend of 
the TC1 group loosely follows that of the CG group. The price trend of the TC1 
drugs does not differ from that of GS drugs probably because manufacturers 
were aiming at getting them accepted into the GS programme. In contrast, TC2 
drugs are less likely to participate, which makes it easier for manufacturers to 
reconsider pricing. 
  
                                              
1 The control variables account for differences within drug markets, measuring the log size of package, 
the logged amount of DDD per product, the logged strength of a unit in a product, and the time the 
product has been on the market. 
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Figure A1.  Price trends relative to the control group before the reform. 
Weighted regression 
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A simple F-test for the joint significance of these interaction terms shows that 
none of the groups jointly differ from the CG. Although none of the interaction 
terms is statistically significant, the price trend of the TC1 and GS groups in 
particular tends to deviate from that of the control group. We therefore include 
the price trends of the 157 drugs in the estimated equation. 
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Appendix 4. Results of the model (1.7) 
Effect of  reform on drug level competition 
Dependent variable: ln (Herfindahl) 
Explanatory variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Participation 1 -0,1005*** 0,0134 -0,1267 -0,0743 
Participation 2 -0,1039*** 0,0149 -0,1331 -0,0747 
Participation 3 -0,1004*** 0,0174 -0,1346 -0,0663 
Participation 4 -0,1075*** 0,0199 -0,1465 -0,0686 
Participation 5 -0,0880*** 0,0227 -0,1324 -0,0435 
Participation 6 -0,0232 0,0238 -0,0699 0,0234 
Length of stay in the market 
(mean) 
0,0138*** 0,0009 0,0121 0,0155 
ln DDD per product (mean) 0,0164 0,0189 -0,0207 0,0534 
ln packet size (mean) -0,0295 0,0147 -0,0582 -0,0008 
ln strength of one pill (mean) 0,0154 0,0211 -0,026 0,0568 
Constant -0,7114*** 0,2568 -1,2149 -0,2079 
Drug level trends No    
Drug fixed effects Yes, F=403,44***   
Time dummies Yes, F=4,31***   
F-test (model sign.) 370.67***    
R2 0.7974    
N 5173       
*** p < 0.01 
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